In the Mid-1960s, the Laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a center of scientific computing since the Manhattan Project, embarked on a search for a new supercomputer intended to fulfill the growing need for computing power in nuclear weapons development. Although depicted at Los Alamos in later years as a smooth transition between vendors, the selection process was a contentious negotiation among computing experts and users over their differing visions of computing and its place at Los Alamos. This article argues that changing technical and political demands on weapons design and Los Alamos's place in the rivalry between IBM and Control Data Corporation further complicated the selection process and challenged the traditional control and direction of Los Alamos's computing strategy. The result was the formation of a new computing division and a reframing of the debate over the long-standing management and purpose of computing at Los Alamos.
In the Mid-1960s, the Laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a center of scientific computing since the Manhattan Project, embarked on a search for a new supercomputer intended to fulfill the growing need for computing power in nuclear weapons development. Although depicted at Los Alamos in later years as a smooth transition between vendors, the selection process was a contentious negotiation among computing experts and users over their differing visions of computing and its place at Los Alamos. This article argues that changing technical and political demands on weapons design and Los Alamos's place in the rivalry between IBM and Control Data Corporation further complicated the selection process and challenged the traditional control and direction of Los Alamos's computing strategy. The result was the formation of a new computing division and a reframing of the debate over the long-standing management and purpose of computing at Los Alamos. I n 1964, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) embarked on a search for a new supercomputer capable of augmenting its aging systems and of meeting the growing user demand for computing power at its Central Computing Facility (CCF). 1,2 Presented internally at Los Alamos in the years that followed as a smooth transition from one computer vendor to another, archival documents and oral history interviews revealed that the selection process was a contentious negotiation of computing strategy among LASL computer users and specialists at a time when computing was assuming a far more central role in nuclear weapons design and scientific research than in the decades before.
The selection took place amid the notorious rivalry between Control Data Corporation (CDC) and IBM in the 1960s, with Los Alamos as an unwitting battleground between the two. The corporate rivalry confused the selection process and complicated the issues under debate at Los Alamos, such as computer performance versus ease of use and price versus freedom to change vendors in the future.
For Los Alamos, the controversial selection effort resulted in more than a new supercomputer reaching the CCF shop floor. It revealed a diversity of visions for the future of Los Alamos computing, intensified dissatisfaction among some groups of users with the existing management of LASL's supercomputer resources, and provided momentum for the formation of a dedicated computing division just as the importance of computing at Los Alamos was about to escalate much faster than anticipated. 3
Background
Computing at Los Alamos began with human computers during the Manhattan Project. Their work supported the design effort of the two atomic weapons developed during World War II. Because of its involvement with some of the most difficult calculation work of the Manhattan Project, such as neutron diffusion and implosion simulation problems, the Theoretical, or "T," Division, under Hans Bethe, managed most of the wartime computing resources at Los Alamos. T Division retained its control even after the war ended and as Los Alamos diversified into electromechanical and digital computing. Although some science divisions created small calculation groups of their own, the computing-related groups of T Division maintained and allocated access to the bulk of the computing services at Los Alamos for over two decades. 4 Computing was less prominent in nuclear weapons design and testing between World War II and the 1950s than it would become from the 1960s on. This was partly due to limitations of the available computing technologies, the nature of US nuclear weapon designs and testing philosophy, and the pressures on Los Alamos during the period. Los Alamos, beginning with the Manhattan Project, was heavily focused on purpose-driven physics performed under severe time constraints, which was not always aided by existing computational methods and technologies. In addition, early digital computing, much like human computing, was usually regarded in the sciences as a form of clerical work. These factors combined at Los Alamos to relegate computing to a relevant but background service activity rather than a field of research of its own, at least in the minds of many weapons designers and physicists who were not the early advocates of digital computing research and development (R&D) that members of T Division's computing groups, like Nicholas Metropolis, had often been.
A technical reason why computing was not as significant in weapons design in the 1940s and early 1950s was the weapons themselves. Early fission weapons, like the Trinity and "Fat Man" implosion design, left much room for refinement and for more efficient use of valuable nuclear material, making it relatively easy to extract significant improvements and add new features during the first years of the Cold War. By the 1950s, Los Alamos produced several new weapon designs per year, and aboveground live testing was the primary means of verifying and refining those designs. Digital computers were employed for tasks like determining the shapes of the explosive charges used to compress a weapon's fissile core and for conducting relatively small-scale simulations of the various components of a weapon during detonation. In fact, Los Alamos ran in 1945 the first-ever program on an electronic digital computer, the ENIAC, which was a feasibility assessment for thermonuclear (fusion) weapons. 5 In the early 1950s, computer-based simulations grew in importance particularly for T Division, which completed the first on-site computer at Los Alamos, the MANIAC, in 1952. Five IBM 700-series mainframes and the MANIAC II followed at Los Alamos over the next five years. Hydrodynamics simulations at Los Alamos often used techniques like the Monte Carlo method, which employed a statistical model to approximate the movement of subatomic particles within a prescribed area called a "cell." A collection of cells, in aggregate, represented the entirety of the space where a detonation was being simulated. The more cells, the finer and more accurate a representation of how materials behaved inside the extreme conditions of a detonating weapon but, consequently, the more computing power and time required for the simulation. From the 1940s through the Mid-1960s, due to the technical limitations of the available computers, most weapons simulation codes operated in one dimension of space, that is, simulating the motion of subatomic particles across a single-dimensional axis. Two-dimensional codes did not enter regular use until after the Mid-1960s. T and other divisions that dealt with weapon design and physics, such as the Weapon Nuclear Engineering (W) Division, wrestled with escalating political pressure to produce thermonuclear weapons after the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949. Digital-computer-based number crunching and simulations aided with the extreme design complexities that thermonuclear weapons added over conventional atomic devices. However, through the 1950s, aboveground live tests remained front and center in the development process, and were used to calibrate computer simulation models. 6 Between the Mid-1950s and the early 1960s, the technical and political landscape began to change for computer use at Los Alamos. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed working thermonuclear weapons by the Mid-1950s, and weapons designers at Los Alamos, including those in T and W Divisions, faced greater technical challenges in reducing the size and increasing the efficiency of their designs due to the complexity of thermonuclear weapons and the considerable refinements already made to weapon efficiency in the years before. Although digital computers and their maintenance and support were expensive, the high cost of weapons materials, such as uranium-235, plutonium, and tritium, meant that the savings that computers brought through increased design efficiencies made funding for new computers at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore relatively easy to justify as the 1950s moved forward. Consequently, several large-scale scientific computing projects began in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) laboratory system as part of the growing movement toward more capable computing for weapons development.
In 1955, IBM launched Project Stretch. To compete with the Remington Rand LARC computer project at Livermore, IBM collaborated with Los Alamos to develop a high-speed computer meant to exceed, by up to one hundred times, the performance of any other system then in use. Delivered to Los Alamos one year late in 1961, the Stretch computer, designated the 7030, supplanted the LARC as the most powerful computer then available. However, the 7030 was initially deemed a disappointment at IBM, as its real-world performance was roughly half its lead engineer's original estimate. Although Stretch was later lauded at IBM for its contributions to the System/360, Stretch had soured chief executive officer Thomas Watson Jr. on large scientific computers for the early 1960s. 7 IBM slowed its high-performance computer component development, Project X, until the perceived engineering problems exhibited with Stretch, particularly with its memory, could be resolved. Consequently, IBM's initial work with Los Alamos and the AEC in the early 1960s to develop a "Super Stretch," which was to be delivered mid-decade, never came to fruition. The Project X computer, which suffered from technical difficulties and insufficient funding and personnel, was not slated for completion until 1967. The subsequent gap at the high end of IBM's product line left room for a new rival to emerge just as Los Alamos began its search for a computer that could surpass Stretch. 8 The development and arrival of Stretch coincided with changing political pressures surrounding nuclear weapons and their testing. The Eisenhower testing moratorium with the Soviet Union halted US live nuclear testing from 1958 through 1961. The moratorium was partly in response to growing international criticism of the dangers of US and Soviet aboveground testing. A dearth of live testing emphasized the need for computer-based simulation at Los Alamos as an alternative method for validating weapon design, adding urgency to the IBM Stretch Project and justifying the purchase in the late 1950s of several IBM 7090 mainframes, the first transistorized scientific computers on the market. Although live testing resumed in 1961 after the moratorium dissolved, the Kennedy Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, or in space, pushing all testing in the United States and Soviet Union underground. 9 A consequence of the LTBT for Los Alamos was that it moved testing exclusively to the Nevada Test Site, away from remote Pacific islands, and it served to routinize the weapons development process into a series of predictable, scheduled phases as opposed to the more rapid, free-form process surrounding the previous atmospheric testing spectacles. Rather than develop and test several new warhead designs per year, as was common in the flurry of designing and testing in the 1950s, a single warhead design in the 1960s required up to a decade to move through the various development stages, from conception to production, with multiple weapons undergoing development concurrently. Part of this shift was due to the reducing returns on new designs, as large increases in efficiency were becoming harder to obtain and weapons design grew to emphasize refinements rather than radically new features.
Under the LTBT, nuclear testing increased rather than decreased in the United States but under a routinized process that escalated the amount of schedule-driven design and computer-based simulation work required to extract ever-smaller improvements out of warhead designs. While testing increased, atomic defense spending decreased from 1960 through the Mid-1970s, and the weapons laboratories saw their budgets diminish year after year. Los Alamos and Livermore refocused on their core missions of weapons development after growing in size and diversifying the scope of their research work through 1960. Consequently, nuclear weapons work expanded to become a larger proportion of the overall work done at Los Alamos through the 1960s. Although Stretch offered Los Alamos an abundance of computing capacity after its installation in 1961, a growing number of users focused on weapons development and, with a greater need and emphasis on computing as an essential part of their work, meant that demand for computer power in the Los Alamos CCF greatly exceeded supply only a few years later. After the contract with IBM to produce a "Super Stretch" had dissolved, T Division had to locate and purchase an alternative system out of those available on the market while under the time pressure of meeting the demand before it could potentially hamper LASL's mission. 10 
The Committees
In September 1964, Bengt Carlson, group leader of the T-1 IBM Computer Support group within T Division, appointed a selection committee of three staff members charged with identifying LASL's computing requirements and devising the criteria that the subsequent advisory committee would use to choose a new supercomputer. As of 1964, T Division was still the single-largest user of LASL's computer facilities, occupying nearly 40 percent of their computing time. Edward Voorhees, who administered T-1's computer systems and operations, headed the selection committee's survey of LASL's existing computing capacity in the summer of 1964 and provided the advisory committee (which advised the AEC on the final purchase decision) with the criteria he had created for choosing a supercomputer that could carry Los Alamos through the 1960s. T Division's effective monopoly in appointing the committees and the selection criteria for the new computer became growing points of contention for computer users from outside T Division, particularly as debates over which computer would serve LASL best intensified over the next year. One of the first and most significant debates was over the predicted escalation in computing demand that the CCF would experience over the coming decade. Those who predicted a slow rate of increase were at odds with committee members who foresaw a rapid increase in demand, as the anticipated rate of change directly impacted LASL's computing purchase and use strategies. 11 The survey that Bengt Carlson commissioned concluded that LASL possessed the equivalent computing power of 2.4 Stretch systems, with most of that power spread across two IBM 7094s (which had replaced the 7090s), Stretch itself, and the upgraded MANIAC II. However, the MANIAC II was dedicated primarily to R&D projects, such as programming language development, not running production code. As of 1964, LASL's computer systems were saturated, with all available computing time in use. 12 The committee's survey estimated that, based on LASL's historical precedent between 1952 and 1964, demand for computing power would increase by approximately 50 percent each year, doubling every two years, through the 1960s. D.V. Susco, a programmer and analyst of problems in weapons development from W Division, calculated the doubling trend in terms of Stretch, estimating that LASL would require the equivalent power of 3. Carson Mark, the T Division leader, described to LASL director Norris Bradbury as a continuing, smooth increase in computing demand. Both Mark and Roger Lazarus, the advisory committee chairman, predicted a smooth, relatively rapid growth in demand for the foreseeable future, noting in their individual reports to Bradbury and the advisory committee that part of the projected growth was an anticipated increase in complexity of codes to be run on the machines. In the Mid-1960s, most weapons simulation code runs still operated in one dimension of space, with a smaller number of less frequently used codes operating in two dimensions. T Division expected the anticipated introduction of three-dimensional codes to increase computer-processing demands markedly in the very long term. For example, a one-dimensional code that required four minutes of processing time on the Stretch and one hundred minutes in two dimensions would require a projected forty hours in three dimensions. Each dimensional jump resulted in about a twenty-five-fold increase in processing time. The problem would grow only more acute with the added variable of time and with finer and finer simulation resolutions. However, oneand two-dimensional codes remained the state of the art in the Mid-1960s. 13 The eighteen-point selection criteria Ed Voorhees developed out of the survey emphasized the need for a computer that would be available soon enough to reduce the immediate strain on the CCF and that would meet the anticipated near-term requirements of increasingly complex one-and two-dimensional codes. Armed with the selection criteria and a sense of urgency, the advisory committee met in September 1964, soliciting bids from twelve computer manufacturers and stipulating LASL's requirements in terms of power, price, and delivery date. The new machine, the committee stipulated, needed to have at least 65K of memory, be at least as powerful as Stretch, offer parallel input/output capability, be a floating-point machine, and be available for delivery in 1965.
Ed Voorhees distributed a questionnaire among LASL computer users for their input on the criteria for a new computer before composing his formal list. However, critics, like the non-T Division representatives on the advisory committee, later argued that some of the selection criteria Voorhees settled on were too vague or were more about pushing the state of the art in computing R&D than finding a practical system. In addition to the selection criteria, the composition of the advisory committee provided another point of dissatisfaction among non-T Division personnel, as only two committee members, compared to T Division's ten representatives (six permanent and four alternates), were invited from outside T Division to participate.
The two non-T Division members came from the Explosives (GMX) and W Divisions, the second-and third-largest users of LASL's computers, respectively. Other members of T-1 were invited to vendor presentations, and their comments were taken into consideration. All members of both committees had extensive programming experience and had served at least seven years with LASL, with four members having served on the Stretch Planning Committee and two others serving on the LASL-IBM Mathematical Planning Committee, which guided the logical design of Stretch. While each committee member had significant computing experience, one division clearly dominated the search process and the criteria by which the machines were to be assessed. Nonexpert users had little involvement in the process beyond the initial questionnaire. 14 
The Search
Of the twelve companies solicited in the advisory committee's bid process, six responded with machines meeting the basic criteria, including Burroughs, CDC, General Electric, IBM, Philco, and Univac. A series of visits and presentations followed over the next two months, as manufacturers' representatives presented bids to the committee at Los Alamos, or committee members traveled to manufacturers and to sites where computers (at least those that did not exist only on paper) could be examined and evaluated in person. The committee also provided performance-test, or "P-series," codes to the manufacturers with working machines. If a manufacturer did not possess a working system, it was instructed to estimate that machine's performance using methods disclosed to the committee and, if possible, to run the codes on a machine of similar architecture. The same series of tests performed on Stretch and an IBM 7094 served as benchmarks for comparison. For example, the Burroughs D851 was an estimated 6.3 times the power of Stretch, a working CDC 6600 scored 5.8, and the IBM 360/70 scored an estimated 1.7. Because the test codes were hand tailored and programmed in longhand, D.V. Susco, the W Division representative, believed that the results for codes programmed in Fortran (the availability of which was a committee requirement for each machine) would be quite different. The test codes were intended as guidelines, rather than absolute determinants. 15 After a two-week round of additional presentations at Los Alamos in which manufacturers presented their performance results and provided more detailed configuration and pricing bids to the combined selection and advisory committees, the CDC 6600 (one of only two computers, along with the GE-635, that was operational for testing at that point) and the Burroughs D851 were the advisory committee's early favorites. The remaining machines were eliminated due to inferior performance compared to the Burroughs or CDC machines, short word length (in the case of the GE), and projected delivery dates that were too distant in the future. IBM, which had proposed the 360/70, a still-unproduced, large model in its new System/360 series of computers, likely grew concerned when it did not receive a follow-up request from Los Alamos about its proposal. IBM reduced its presence in the highperformance computing market in the years following Thomas Watson Jr.'s disappointment with Stretch. In that time, Watson had bet the company's future on a single-system strategy, with the mostly intercompatible line of S/360 computers, announced in April 1964, as IBM's primary product line. While the System/360 strategy proved successful, the 360/70 model that IBM proposed to Los Alamos was significantly less powerful than several of the other contenders. The S/360's orientation toward business data processing, likewise, gave some of the LASL committee members pause over its suitability for scientific computing. IBM's absence from the high-performance computer market had impacted its ability to compete with the likes of Control Data's 6600 supercomputer. 16 Founded in 1957, CDC stocked its ranks with well-chosen expertise drawn from ERA and Univac. Following on the success of his 1604 model, the 6600 was Seymour Cray's first supercomputer at CDC. Design work began in 1960, with the 6600 announced only two months before IBM publicly conceded the performance disappointment with Stretch. Among its more unusual features, the 6600 was the first of what is now called a Reduced-Instruction-Set Computer (RISC), with its central processing unit employing only sixty-four instructions, compared to the 735 instructions built into Stretch. Instructions for housekeeping tasks and I/O were offloaded onto the 6600's ten peripheral processing units, which left the central processor free and optimized for calculation work. The 6600 was easily the world's most powerful supercomputer on its release. While Los Alamos conducted its search, Lawrence Livermore took delivery of its first 6600 in September 1964, giving the young CDC a growing presence and legitimacy in the AEC lab system. 17 Losing ground to CDC, Watson reversed his position that had relegated high-performance computing development to a low priority at IBM, pouring substantial effort into a larger S/360 model, the Model 90. However, in 1964, the 360/90 was at least several years off, even further than the Model 70 and far beyond the delivery date that Los Alamos stipulated. With its chief executive officer pushing aggressive tactics to sell the still-ephemeral Model 90, even to the point of selling the machine at a loss to curtail sales of the 6600, IBM returned to Los Alamos with a new proposal, offering to install a series of S/360 computers over the following two years with a more powerful model to replace the previous unit as the larger computers became available. Most of the manufacturers revised their proposals during the selection process, updating the specifications, terms, and pricing on their bids between September and December. However, IBM's changes were the most dramatic. 18 From October to December 1964, IBM revised its proposals several times, with evershorter delivery times; faster variants of the 360; better deals on service, trade-ins, and peripherals; and significantly reduced prices. IBM's strategy was to buy time for the Model-90 range using financially attractive trade-in offers on lower-powered machines that would be available sooner. William W. Wood, leader of GMX-10, the Statistical Mechanism and Detonation Theory group, was the sole GMX Division representative on the committee. Wood was suspicious of IBM's revised performance estimates, with a proposed 360/91 (which replaced the Model 90 on offer; a 360/92 replaced the 91 in yet another proposal) purporting a tenfold performance increase over the Model 70 despite the newer system's memory being largely unchanged from the 70. Selection committee member Jack Worlton expressed similar concerns about IBM performance estimates due to the machine's memory configuration. The selection committee itself made a point of examining the adequacy of the proposed Model 91 memory but could not conclude its investigation before time constraints meant that the committee members had to provide their recommendations in December. 19 On November 16, days after IBM made its revised proposal offering an interim 360/70 to trade for the Model 90, Burroughs changed the D851 delivery date from 1965 to March 1966, eliminating it from consideration. With the field down to two contenders, the advisory committee invited CDC to revise its bid in response to IBM. CDC responded with several package deals, much like IBM's, offering more and better disk storage and peripherals and, in one configuration, the option to trade the 6600 at a favorable rate for the 6800 once it became available in 1967. IBM and CDC made a series of counterproposals into December 1964, with IBM's plan for a series of increasingly powerful S/360 models plus peripherals offering less power in the intervening years than the CDC 6600 before installation of the Model 92 in 1966 but costing approximately $1 million less than the revised CDC offerings, assuming the trade of the 6600 for a 6800 in 1967. At the end of 1964, the advisory committee members submitted reports to the committee chairman, Roger Lazarus, a physicist who joined T Division in 1951 and became an expert in nuclear weapons research using computers. The committee member reports included their suggestions, preferences, and, in a few cases, displeasure with the selection process and committee, which were combined into a summary that outlined the far-from-unanimous purchase recommendation of the committee. 20 
The Selection
The seven official committee reports (one committee member, R. Thomas, served as an alternate for Harry C. Hoyt but did not report on his own) ranged from one to sixteen pages in length, with most authors summarizing the selection process and a few voicing their dissatisfaction with it before providing their recommendation. D.V. Susco's sixteen-page report provided detailed, itemized points where the selection process was apparently deficient in its task, arguing that the selection criteria were not sufficiently specific or definitive, to the point of causing confusion among vendors (IBM, for example, expressed initial confusion over what constituted an "interim" computer), and that it specified hardware and software preferences that were not in line with LASL's needs or with what was practical to implement. The lack of specificity over when in 1965 delivery should take place, for example, was one point of contention for Susco, and the clause stating that multiprocessing capability should be a consideration was another, given the extreme challenge of integrating an untested multiprocessor computer into production use at LASL while multiprocessor technology remained in its infancy. William Wood, the GMX-10 representative, included with his report a response to Roger Lazarus's memo of November 23. Lazarus had expressed disappointment that the advisory committee's recommendation would clearly not be unanimous. 21 Although less vitriolic than Susco's report, Wood cited Voorhees's selection criteria as a possible cause of the perceived disappointment. Wood did not consider a lack of unanimous agreement as a disappointment or failure, nor did Susco. Instead, the lack of consensus, in Wood's view, was a consequence of the speed with which the committees were expected to decide and a general lack of adequate data about the machines in question, which made it difficult to distinguish the three major systems under investigation. Susco stated that disunity also reflected the diversity of interests and individual experiences within the committee. Contrary to Lazarus's statement in his November 23 memo that the advisory committee had come to the end of its usefulness, Susco and Wood contended that the difficulty of the selection process meant that a computer study group of some sort was still needed. Susco indicated that a computer study group dedicated to remaining "continually aware of the current status of computing machines and their assorted accessories" should become a permanent fixture to aid future decision processes. The remaining reports, all from T Division personnel, focused mostly on the difficulty of choosing between roughly equal proposals, with a few suggesting a refinement of the criteria specific to the two remaining systems. 22 Written after the withdrawal of Burroughs as a contender, the reports chose between the later IBM and CDC proposals, although some outlined the reasons for eliminating various other machines. Most of the reports offered justification for their decisions, providing perspectives on how the various advisory committee members perceived the technologies on offer and how they interpreted the attributes of those technologies in relation to LASL's computing needs and environment. It is this part of the selection process where the divergence of interpretations among committee members regarding the role of computing at LASL, both current and in the envisioned future, is most discernible. Harry Hoyt, who was responsible for supervising and programming weapons design and numerical analysis problems in T-5, selected the IBM proposal. Stating that while the cost difference between the two proposals was small, he believed that IBM, with its promise of a substantially more powerful Model 92 in 1967, offered LASL the greatest computing capacity in the long term. Because of the similarity of the existing proposals, Hoyt recommended that the selection criteria be rewritten so that IBM and CDC could offer more pointed proposals to differentiate their cost/performance differences. Hoyt's recommendation was the shortest and offered the least justification, focusing entirely on cost versus performance. 23 Tom Jordon, who supervised applied mathe matics and problem programming in T-1, acknowledged the attractive economics of package deals but feared that they removed too much flexibility from future procurement decisions. Jordon stated that no one only three years earlier could have foreseen the computers available to the advisory committee, warning that committing to a package deal at that point in the past would have left Los Alamos with substantially inferior systems in the Mid-1960s. He stated his hopes that, if the work toward a common automatic programming language continued outside LASL and caught on inside, switching manufacturers in the future would be less burdensome. Based on those viewpoints, Jordon selected the CDC 6600, as it was the most capable machine available without the need for a package deal. While he praised its speed and projected reliability, Jordon admitted that the 6600 would be more difficult to program and optimize than the 360/70 due to the CDC relying on "artificial and inflexible" organization techniques for its performance rather than advanced component design. The IBM series, Jordon continued, would offer greater compatibility with existing Los Alamos equipment, and the systems themselves were more flexible than CDC's, but trailed in deliverable performance. For Jordon, the initial penalties of the 6600, its incompatibility with existing Los Alamos equipment, and the greater difficulty of programming for its unusual architecture were worth the flexibility it brought for future computer selection. 24 B. Meixner, a programmer in weapons research from T-2, focused on the cost of reprogramming codes for a new machine in addition to the time required to bring a new computer up to full capacity. Examining the packages from both suppliers, Meixner speculated that the additional power of the 6600 might not be in full use before its 6800 replacement arrived due to the required optimizing time, thus making CDC's initial power advantage less significant than it would appear. IBM's proposal of a gradual increase in computing power, Meixner argued, also appeared to be "more in line with the projected needs of the laboratory." In addition, the 360 series offered technical refinements the 6600 lacked, such as an interrupt system, which allowed the IBM to recover automatically from a fault, and the IBM offered a level of compatibility with existing Los Alamos equipment. Remaining an IBM shop would also reduce the number of in-house engineers and varieties of equipment needed to support the machines of two different manufacturers. Because of the advertised forward compatibility in the 360 line, the time spent optimizing code for the 360/70 could, per Meixner, ensure that its larger replacement entered full production capacity quickly and efficiently when it arrived. Recommending purchase of the IBM proposal, Meixner concluded with the suggestion that if his recommendation could not be justified based on the current selection procedure, the criteria should be rendered more stringent, as additional selection time was preferable to purchasing the wrong machine. 25 Meixner was not alone in his emphasis on ease of programming and code optimization over potential short-term performance advantages. David F. Woods of T-6, who supervised the programming of problems in weapons design, recommended the IBM proposal for similar reasons. Woods believed the IBM machine to be "much more pleasant to deal with," a contention that supporters of the CDC proposal did not dispute. Woods contended that bringing either machine up to 20 percent production capacity within three months of delivery was "impossibly optimistic," citing, like Meixner, that the CDC machine's performance advantage was less significant when placed in the perspective of the time needed to program and optimize a completely unfamiliar machine. According to Woods, optimizing a single one of LASL's more complex codes for either machine would require more than one hundred hours for several expert programmers. The easier programming environment of the IBM, which included a larger vocabulary and a larger memory (131K versus 65K for the CDC) for the money, combined with a shorter projected interim period to push Woods toward the IBM. He considered the machine construction time line of the betterestablished IBM to be more realistic than that of the CDC. Woods also cited the need for only one set of maintenance facilities if LASL remained with IBM, if the proposals were otherwise equal, to be sufficient to justify his decision. 26 Susco's estimation of the 6600 effectively echoed Meixner, although he was not as pessimistic about the time and effort needed to bring the computer to production capacity. Susco simply doubted that LASL required the power the CDC machine offered as early as it did. Based on IBM's technical presentation, Susco found IBM's power estimates of the 360/91 to be unlikely, possibly by a factor of two, but his conservative estimates of LASL's future computing needs meant that the gradual increases in power found in the IBM proposal, even if halved, were more than adequate. The S/360's larger vocabulary than the CDC machine and the easier transition in the LASL computing environment were Susco's primary reasons for choosing the IBM path. 27 William Wood, who agreed with Susco in his proposal to Bengt Carlson on the permanent formation of a computer study group with members from outside T Division, diverged in his computer selection. Wood coincided with Tom Jordon's recommendation that LASL opt for the 6600 without the 6800 option, commenting that it was a mistake to try to see "too far into the future" with supercomputing. Wood acknowledged the less attractive features of the 6600, such as its limited vocabulary and difficult programming environment, stating that they were understandable reasons for other committee members to opt against it. Indeed, Wood described the CDC machine as a "tolerable solution" and indicated that the Burroughs machine would have been his first choice had it still been in the offing due to its predicted superior programming environment and modular expandability. Stating that he was distrustful of predictions that computing requirements would increase geometrically, Wood believed that the IBM upgrade path would likely be adequate for LASL's future computing needs, but he opted for the 6600 because it allowed greater flexibility in the future than a locked-in upgrade path. 28 In his report, Roger Lazarus reiterated the difficulty of judging the IBM and CDC offers against one another but did not provide elaborate detail explaining his choice of the 6600. Instead, Lazarus provided a chronology of the bid process and stipulated that both IBM and CDC had features in their favor: a larger computing capacity increase in the near term for the 6600 and an earlier delivery time, lower price, and more attractive system design for the IBM. The CDC, although not as "pleasant" to work with, was his choice but only by a "very slim margin." Lazarus was not the deciding vote, as the IBM proposal already carried the committee majority. The following February, the LASL Department of Supply and Property issued the committee recommendation to the AEC, which commenced the official contract with IBM. Not unified in choice or in its priority of the given selection criteria (where the scope and detail of the criteria were deemed adequate at all), the advisory committee represented several overlapping interpretations of how the available computer options fit within differing visions of computing at LASL. 29 Two related points of contention dominated the decision-making process: the ease of integrating and optimizing a new system for production and the predicted rate of increase in computing demand at LASL. B. Meixner and David Woods were the most vocal in their emphasis on ease of programming, contending that nominally more powerful computing hardware mattered little when it could not be used. Easing the transition of codes and facilities, in both the near and the long term, was of greater importance than immediate gains in performance. Susco and William Wood argued similar points in their skepticism of the predicted rate of increasing demand but arrived at differing conclusions. While Hoyt contended that the IBM proposal offered the most performance in the long term, Susco doubted IBM's performance estimates but found the estimates unimportant, believing that they exceeded the demand increases he envisioned. The anticipated ease of transition found with IBM was the most salient consideration from Susco's perspective. William Wood agreed that the demand increases that the selection committee predicted were likely overblown but opted for the 6600 for the same reasons as Tom Jordon, warning that planning too far into the future of supercomputing would reduce LASL's flexibility. Wood, however, made a point in his memo to Roger Lazarus to stress the importance of programming ease, stating that it was not [underline in the original] the least of all the desirable attributes of computing machinery. He likewise expressed displeasure at the inadequacy of CDC's documentation and of the P-series tests in general but believed that the initial inconvenience of the 6600 was worth freedom of selection in the future. 30 The decisions and divisions within the advisory committee over its computer options were more complex than estimates of performance versus cost or ease of programming versus technical superiority. They reflected differing visions of computing's place at Los Alamos and where it could or should go in LASL's future. The committee's calculus of convenience versus performance versus flexibility, amid questions over the suitability of the selection criteria, uncertainties over untested or nearly untested technologies, and differences in the power dynamic between T Division and other divisions in the selection process, resulted in a narrow preference for IBM but not necessarily for the same reasons. IBM's sales tactics, which placed LASL on the front lines of Big Blue's rivalry with CDC, complicated an already tense and hurried selection process, with a variety of packages and promises meant to reduce the luster of the 6600. An immediate consequence was an advisory committee whose members were generally dissatisfied with the choices and time constraints placed on them amid an array of technical promises and delivery timetables that appeared, at best, overly optimistic. The long-term consequences began to unfold as the IBM S/360 contract, like the Super Stretch contract before it, began to fall apart.
Changing Plans
After selecting the IBM proposal, Los Alamos spent the remainder of 1965 preparing the CCF for the installation of the first in a series of IBM machines slated to arrive starting in November of that year. However, in September, IBM modified its final proposal, spurring a series of contract renegotiations before IBM notified the AEC that the entire S/360 product line delivery schedule would slip and that one of the machines in the contract with Los Alamos, the Model 91 J, would not be delivered at all. IBM offered to replace the 91 J with two different models, the last of which, the Model 95, would be delayed fourteen months over the previously proposed final machine, the Model 92. IBM likewise withdrew from its proposal the high-performance parallel disks and fast bulk storage that had been required components in the original bid criteria and announced that key software packages, such as the multiprogramming system, which was among the 360's more attractive features, would not be available for a year or longer after they were promised. As Roger Lazarus later recalled of IBM's changing proposals, "It was the last straw." While IBM's offerings worsened, those of CDC improved, with new high-performance disks entering CDC's product line in November 1965. CDC's software offerings for the 6600 also improved, along with the machine's reputation for reliability. The original selection committee, including Jack Worlton, Ed Voorhees, and Chester Kazek, along with T. Mannon, the LASL procurement auditor, rewrote the procurement request, opting for the CDC 6600 and a collection of peripherals for slightly more than the amount agreed to by IBM in January. CDC later won a large antitrust settlement from IBM because of Big Blue's anticompetitive sales tactics against the 6600. 31 Installed in July 1966, the 6600 provided a significant increase in CCF computing capacity as it entered production use over the following six months. Becoming a "CDC shop," which ended a business and collaborative relationship with IBM that extended back to the Manhattan Project, was only one long-term consequence of the Mid-1960s supercomputer selection process for Los Alamos. Bengt Carlson, leader of the T-1 IBM Computer Support group since 1951, had proposed within T Division the formation a dedicated computing division at Los Alamos before the difficulties with IBM. As computing became increasingly important to LASL's core weapons work and to the "computable sciences" in general, in the early 1960s, the task of maintaining and allocating access to LASL's computing resources became more onerous and complex for a division with a variety of other responsibilities. Although still the largest, T Division was no longer the primary user of LASL's high-end computers but rather one among many. As such, Carlson found the task of avoiding even the semblance of favoritism to his own division increasingly difficult when allocating computer access to users. Research groups within T Division complained that Carlson's efforts at avoiding favoritism had gone too far, putting T Division at a disadvantage. The frustration of facing criticism from both sides may have contributed to his lack of interest in heading a new computing division and his urging of Roger Lazarus to lead it instead. 32 The possibility of a dedicated computing division gained traction after T Division's style of leadership during the selection raised the ire of other divisions, like GMX and W, as some of their staffers felt underrepresented in the process and with T Division's management in general. D.V. Susco's complaint to Roger Lazarus about T Division using the selection criteria to push the state of the art in computing was also part of a growing tension between T Division and some of its users. T Division had a tradition of pursuing computing research and development that extended back to the infancy of digital computing in the preceding decades, as found with the construction of the MANIAC and the use of the MANIAC II as an R&D platform. For early advocates of digital computing, like Nicholas Metropolis, on-site R&D at Los Alamos provided hands-on, local experience with computing and fed back into the overall computing capabilities of LASL. For some users, particularly those who viewed computers simply as tools rather than as a field of research in their own right, T Division's interest in R&D came at the expense of the computing services the division provided. As computing became more important to a larger number of users, the tension between computing as a science and computing as a service at Los Alamos grew more pronounced. Susco's complaint would not be the last in the years that followed. For director Norris Bradbury, there were also logistical and budgetary reasons for a separate computing division. Several divisions were pursuing their own computing efforts, and consolidating LASL computing under a single division would reduce the redundancy of multiple, often incompatible efforts.
Formed in April 1968 out of the three computing-related groups within T Division, the Computing Sciences and Services, or "C" Division, marked the beginning of computing as its own, separate activity at Los Alamos, independent of a preexisting science division. While not unusual at an AEC weapons laboratory, as Livermore had operated a dedicated Computational Division since its founding in 1952, the creation of C Division at Los Alamos marked the maturation of computing as a key resource in LASL's mission. The traditional management of Los Alamos computing and its place as an ancillary activity within the purview of its largest user were no longer as feasible or as uncontroversial as they had been before computing resources came to occupy a more pivotal role at LASL. However, many of the pressures behind C Division's formation, both from T Division and from other users, did not end in 1968 but only intensified amid far more radical changes to Los Alamos computing than were predicted only a few years before.
Rather than doubling every two years, as was predicted during the selection effort of the Mid-1960s, the demand for computing power at LASL nearly quadrupled into the 1970s, jumping from the equivalent power of 2.4 Stretch systems in 1964 to the equivalent of 133 by 1972. The previous, worst-case-scenario prediction for 1972 had been only about forty-three. The added capacity came from C Division attempting to meet demand with the rapid purchase of several new machines, including three additional CDC 6600s, then four of its follow-on machine, the 7600. Yet strained capacity remained the norm, as the average number of jobs per month at the CCF increased from 10,400 in 1964 to 21,000 in 1967 and to 32,000 in 1970, the equivalent of running one job per staff member at LASL per day. In 1970, Roger Lazarus, the former advisory committee chair and the first C Division leader, attributed a large part of the problem to the increased complexity of the codes being run, many of which were being introduced sooner than expected. The new codes included the routine use of 2D implosion calculations beginning in 1968. It was not merely the growing number of jobs being run that devoured computing time; it was also the increase in their complexity as simulations grew more detailed and exacting in response to more challenging design and testing efforts. 33 The formation of C Division took place just as the technical and political factors that spurred a heightened role for computing at Los Alamos in the early to-Mid-1960s began to intensify demand at an unprecedented rate into the 1970s. The complications of increasing yet unmet demand combined with user issues surrounding C Division's continuity with T Division. Most of T Division's computing personnel, including Roger Lazarus, simply transferred with their groups to the new division. C Division maintained its ancestral division's interest in pursuing computer science R&D, and some of its most important users, such weapons designers Michael Simmons and Reid Worlton, also believed that C Division remained somewhat inwardly focused and disconnected from users' concerns and demands, much as T Division had been during its computing tenure. Several retired C Division staffers, like Jack Worlton, later agreed with their assessment. Roger Lazarus and his division remained committed to much of the philosophy that had driven computing at Los Alamos for several decades, all while attempting to quell unprecedented demands for computing power from users across LASL. User issues with the management and philosophy of Los Alamos computing, brought to the fore during the supercomputer selection process of the Mid-1960s and exacerbated through corporate rivalry and intrigue, became rallying points that would later redefine computing at LASL in the 1970s. 34 
Conclusion
The selection of a new supercomputer at Los Alamos in the Mid-1960s was far from a simple choice or a smooth transition to a new vendor. Instead, it highlighted the many technical, political, and social changes that surrounded the escalating importance of computing at a US nuclear weapons laboratory during the height of the Cold War. Los Alamos was an early adopter and developer of digital computing, but the role and place of computing at LASL was initially limited due to the constraints of the available technologies, the nature of early nuclear weapons, and the politics behind their testing. The long-standing Los Alamos approach toward computing as an ancillary service and research subject contained within a computing-reliant science division remained tenable as long as relatively simple weapon designs and atmospheric testing retained their primacy. As changing technical and political demands brought computing more into the foreground at LASL, the traditional T Division methodology and inward focus encountered resistance from users who viewed computing more strictly as a service than as a field of study. The complication of a corporate battle, while not instigating the issues behind the selection process, highlighted the differences in vision and the differential in power between much of T Division and some of its major users. As tensions grew within and between divisions, the circuitous transition to CDC, the end of the selection effort, marked the beginning of computing as a separate, increasingly vital activity within Los Alamos. The consequent continuity in computing management and philosophy after 1968, combined with a rapid, unexpected escalation of computing demand and reach at LASL, was the starting point for an even more extensive reshaping of Los Alamos computing that was yet to come.
